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Abstract
We analyze the impact of the effectiveness of internal regulation for the development of internal 
and export markets for credence goods, particularly for a developing country which is an 
exporter (or a potential exporter). 
 In the model, since goods of actual different quality can be sold as high quality goods, expected 
quality is a function of consumers’ beliefs about the effectiveness of 
regulation.  Foreign consumers, who cannot observe foreign regulation as closely as domestic 
ones, may partly base their expectations on the level of development of the exporting country. 
Low effectiveness, negative stereotype and low consumers’ trust may cause a failure in the 
market for high quality, and there may be a trap of underdevelopment and no high quality 
exports. The main policy implications are that increasing the effectiveness of regulation 
improves export prospects; standard setting and enforcement by external actors, such as 
supermarkets, or NGOs in the case of certain niche markets, is likely to be beneficial. 
J.E.L. Codes: L15, F13, O12
1. INTRODUCTION
The perception consumers have of the effectiveness of regulation on product quality and 
safety in a country is generally important for the development of internal and especially export 
markets.  Such  perception and trust become crucial  when consumers cannot really evaluate 
some or all of a product’s attributes, especially process attributes: it may be prohibitive to find 
out whether a product is actually “environmentally friendly”, “organic”, or simply completely 
safe. Therefore consumers’  notion of quality will be directly related to their trust in regulation. 
In the EU, several major food safety crises during the last decades provide a vivid illustration of 
the role of consumers’ trust and how its drop can cause severe damage to the sector involved. 
However, developing exporters may have special problems in this area: a July 2007 report 
(BBC, 2007) according to which  “From pet food to toothpaste, tyres to jewellery and seafood to 
toys, questions have been raised over the reliability of Chinese-made goods…. part of the 
problem is that the speed of China's expansion into the global export market has not been 
matched by the growth of a countrywide regulatory infrastructure…” illustrates  widespread 
perceptions  in the media. Similar  perceptions  may be associated to smaller developing 
exporters. 
There has been a growing literature on informational problems when quality –of goods and 
services- is not fully observable   before purchase by consumers. Many contributions have 
analyzed the economics of various forms of labeling, including geographical indications, 
genetically modified organisms and eco-labeling (see for instance Anania and Nisticò, 2004; Costa et al., 2009; Menapace and Moschini 2010 and related references). This paper focuses 
specifically on the role of the effectiveness of internal regulation on quality, and of consumers’ 
trust in such regulation, in the context of “credence” goods for high quality markets, and 
particularly for a developing country who is an exporter or a potential exporter. 
Trust or credence goods have the common characteristic that consumers cannot evaluate 
some or all of their attributes either by inspection or after the experience of consumption (Darby 
and Karni, 1973), therefore standards and consumers’ trust are crucial for the development of 
their markets. It is a vast and relevant category of products, because actual quality is very often 
difficult to judge. 
Although the term regulation usually refers to governmental standards, the term standards 
and regulation will be used here indifferently to refer to all standards, public or private, 
involving certification. 
The term “effectiveness of regulation”, unless better specified, indicates the scope of 
regulation i.e. to what extent standards meet consumers demand for product quality and safety; 
the quality and relevance of the standards in terms of meeting the defined objectives; the 
efficacy of the monitoring system in ensuring that producers actually meet the standard. The 
latter two characteristics also indicate to what extent consumers can trust regulation, e.g. the 
probability that a product labeled “environmentally friendly” actually is environmentally 
friendly.  
The paper is organized as follows: sections 2 briefly reviews credence goods and the 
relationship between standards and trade; section 3 introduces the model’s hypothesis on 
consumers’ expectations about quality; section 4 presents a model on the relationship between 
consumers’ trust and the internal and export markets for high quality credence goods
1. 
There are two development dimensions of the problem. First, regulation may often be less 
effective in developing countries. Second, foreign consumers may partly base their expectations 
about product quality on the level of development of the producing country as a proxy for the 
effectiveness of its regulation, i.e. on general notions about the relationship between regulation 
on quality and income level. Hence developing country exporters may suffer from a specific 
“trust” problem regarding the effectiveness of internal regulation, which may hamper high 
quality exports: low effectiveness of internal regulation could have an heavy impact on foreign 
demand for high quality credence goods, in general, but  more so for a developing country. 
In such circumstances mutual recognition may not be a solution, since it does not address 
the trust problem. Improving the public supply of standards and the effectiveness of internal 
regulation, acquiring reputation also through NGOs and the pursuit of harmonization are better 
strategies. Standard setting and enforcement by external actors such as supermarkets along value 
chains is also beneficial in the context of ineffective internal regulation and/or prejudice. 
2.  CREDENCE ATTRIBUTES, STANDARDS AND TRADE
The information environment for different product attributes may be search, experience, or 
credence in nature: the consumer can learn about the quality level prior to purchase (search), 
1 For a discussion focused on organic and fair trade agricultural products see  Cuffaro and  Liu (2008). 
2after purchase and use (experience), or not at all (credence). Credence attributes can obviously 
be of a very different nature, but, restricting the discussion in this paper to goods
2, there are two 
major classes that have received increasing attention:  
(i) Attributes that have health/safety consequences
3; 
(ii) Consumers’ demand/(willingness to pay) for attributes that are of ‘’altruistic” nature, 
i.e. related to concern for “others”, typically to the production processes (fairness of 
distribution, the environmental cost of production, the use of child labor,  the animal 
welfare standards applied). An important example is the demand for “fair trade.”
Standards are increasingly important for trade for several reasons: first, the shift from mass 
markets to markets with differentiated products and niches serving consumers with relatively 
high incomes, who increasingly demand high quality, safety and “credence”, attributes; second, 
the trend towards outsourcing for cost reduction
4; third, the significant decline of tariff barriers, 
implying that differences in product and process standards gain importance for trade flows and 
in the trade liberalization arena. 
Standards may be set by governments or by the industry itself, producers, buyers or 
retailers. Many standards are also set by NGOs and in some cases also trade unions. Finally, 
governments, the private sector and NGOs may form coalitions to set standards. 
There are sectors, such as agribusiness, where growing public concern about safety has 
increased the scope and stringency of public standards. Such stringency and the obligations 
placed on companies, combined with the need to simplify the management of sourcing have 
generated an explosion of collective private standards (Humphrey, 2006).
The privatization of standards has been more pronounced in the developing countries, 
where the effectiveness of public standards – their scope, their quality and relevance in terms of 
meeting the defined objectives and the effectiveness of the monitoring system in ensuring that 
producers actually meet the standard -  was generally lower
5. 
2 An important class of trust products is medical and legal services and a variety of repair services. The 
peculiarity is that it is very difficult for consumers not only to discover quality but also to determine the 
extent of the service that was needed and how much was actually performed, even when the success of 
performing the service is observable. This information asymmetry creates obvious incentives for 
opportunistic behavior by the sellers. Models tend predict that either experts over treat consumers, or 
search and diagnosis costs are excessive, or there is fraud in the form of overcharging consumers, or 
experts have inefficient capacity levels (Emons, 1997 and 2001; Wolinsky, 1983).
3 Often the level of assurance “demanded’’ by (groups of) consumers is ‘’higher’’ than the assurance 
provided by existing, well established regulation, based on objective, scientific assessment of risk. For 
example in the case of food there is a demand for a ”lower” level of chemical residues on fruits and 
vegetables or drug residues in meat.
4 As extensively discussed in the literature, the combination of  branding (as a strategy to add value to 
products), increasing standards requirements (by consumers and governments) and outsourcing spreads 
a pattern of industrial organization whereby production is coordinated across borders by a lead firm 
that defines and enforces multiple product and process standards. 
5 In agribusiness privatization has occurred in two distinct ways: on the one hand large  firms, mostly 
supermarkets and large processors and especially multinationals, created private standards generally 
meeting or exceeding the stringency of public standards and insured their implementation through 
3From the point of view of developing countries several theoretical arguments militate in 
favor of concentrating efforts towards improving the effectiveness of internal regulation and 
pursuing the multilateral harmonization solution.  
Consumers’ perception of quality is influenced by the product’s intrinsic attributes as well 
as by extrinsic indicators and cues provided by the seller of the product. Extrinsic indicators 
(e.g., certification, labeling) and cues (e.g. brand name, packaging, price) convey search 
information to the consumer, since they are available prior to purchase. An attribute can switch 
between the categories of search, experience, and credence. For example, a regulation such as 
mandatory labeling can change a priori credence characteristic such as uses of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), into a search characteristic (Caswell, 1988; Grolleau and Caswell, 
2005).
However the role of regulation and standards in the market for experience or credence 
goods depends also on how much consumers can “trust” regulation, i.e. to what extent they 
believe that a product marked “high quality” is actually a high quality good.
Regulation may be ineffective for several reasons. For example, in many countries firms 
apply to independent labeling agencies for a license to use a particular label stating that their 
product is environmentally friendly, socially responsible or safe. These ecolabeling programs are 
often applied to products where consumers would generally be individually unable to determine 
the actual environmental friendliness (e.g. the biodegradability of a product)  and the firm’s 
compliance is gauged by random monitoring. But when monitoring is random, certification must 
be viewed as noisy. Furthermore, the certifying party cannot be certain that the firm always uses 
an environmentally friendly technique, nor that the monitoring scheme is able to perfectly detect 
any violations. Even if the certifying process is perfectly able to evaluate a product’s compliance 
with the test’s standards, standards may not be perfectly correlated  with  “environmental 
friendliness”
6 (Engel, 1998; Mason, 2006).  
In addition, certifiers have mixed incentives: the incentive to maximize the number of 
clients, the incentive to maintain their reputation.  In other words, third party verification does 
not automatically guarantee impartiality or absence of conflicts of interest
7.  
Finally, enforcing a process standard may be a very difficult problem in the context of 
value chains coordination across borders, as illustrated by the recent safety crisis within the US 
toys industry in relation to production in China
8. 
vertical co-ordination. On the other hand, NGOs have provided the standards and the monitoring and 
enforcing mechanism for many credence products with “ethical” attributes, occupying a fast growing 
market segment of products originating in the poor countries (Reardon et al., 1999).
6 In the Mason  (2006) model of ecolabeling, the certifying test is subject to two types of errors: there 
are some green sellers that would fail the test and some brown sellers that would pass the test
. 
7 Evidence on opportunist behavior in the certification systems in the EU is reported in Jahn, Schramm 
and Spiller (2005).
8 In the summer of 2007 RC2, which operates in China through coordination of a local network of 
contract manufacturers, without owning factories, recalled 1.5 million trains and accessories because a 
supplier had coated them in lead paint. The same summer   lead paint prompted Mattel – which 
outsources to up to 50 manufacturers in China - to recall 967,000 toys, according to company sources 
because either a contract manufacturer used paint from a non certified supplier or  a certified supplier 
cheated (BBC, 2007). 
4The development of credence goods markets depends crucially on consumers’ trust in 
regulation, therefore trust in domestic and foreign regulation is the problem to be addressed. 
3. CONSUMERS’ EXPECTATIONS ABOUT QUALITY
We  use three main hypothesis regarding consumers’ expectations about quality.  
First, expected quality is a function of consumers’ beliefs about the effectiveness of 
regulation. 
Second, domestic and foreign consumers may hold different beliefs. Domestic consumers 
know the effectiveness of internal regulation and the incidence of cheaters and base their 
expectations on such incidence. Foreign consumers base their expectations on the percentage of 
imports from the country which failed border quality inspection, which is in turn linked to the 
effectiveness of internal regulation in the exporting country, but are also influenced by a country 
of origin stereotype. Their trust in the regulation of product quality increases with the level of 
development of the exporting country. 
The second assumption is based on the idea that since foreign consumers cannot observe 
regulation in each country of origin of their imports as closely as domestic consumers, they may 
partly base their expectations about product quality on general notions about the relationship 
between regulation on quality and income level. 
In general what foreign consumers can observe about the effectiveness of regulation in 
exporting countries is a very loose indicator of such effectiveness. For example Jaffee and 
Henson (2004) report that over a typical three year period the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) undertakes inspections of all domestic firms that produce low-acid canned foods, yet the 
same inspections are undertaken on just 3 percent of foreign facilities exporting such products to 
the United States. Even after substantially increasing resources for the inspection of food 
imports, the FDA still inspects only 1 to 2 percent of the more than six million consignments of 
food and cosmetic products imported each year. Regulatory oversight for certain products and 
markets is more stringent on domestic, rather than imported supplies (World Bank, 2005). 
Marketing and business research shows  that consumers do use country of origin as a 
quality signal especially when information about quality is ambiguous
9. Country of origin is 
regarded as a cognitive cue, viz., an informational stimulus about or relating to a product that is 
used by consumers to infer beliefs regarding product attributes such as quality, and since it can 
be manipulated without changing the physical product, it is an extrinsic cue like price, brand 
name and retailer reputation.  
The cognitive processes underlying the effects of country-of-origin on product evaluation 
may be explained through different hypothesis, some of which are especially relevant for 
credence attributes. For example  research on the role of stereotypes suggests that these may be 
used as a heuristic basis for judgements especially when the amount of attribute information is 
large and difficult to integrate or when other information is lacking. Thus, subjects who learn 
that a product is originating in a country with a reputation for high quality may use this 
9 In a country of origin study typically consumers are asked to form an overall evaluation of a product 
alternative that is described verbally by a number of cues, including country of origin.
5knowledge as a basis for evaluation without considering information about the product’s specific 
attributes, especially if evaluating the information is difficult (Hong and   Wyer,   1989); 
Maheswaran (1994) examines consumer expertise and attribute information as moderating the 
effects of country of origin, and shows that all types of consumers use country of origin 
evaluations when attribute information is ambiguous.  
Product/country   images   contain   widely   shared   cultural   stereotypes.   For   example, 
consumers recognize that the production of high-quality technical products requires a highly 
trained and educated workforce; hence, they perceive that such products are of better quality 
when produced in developed countries (Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999). In a review of country- 
of-origin effects on product evaluation, Bilkey and Nes (1982) point out that several studies 
found a hierarchy of biases, including a seemingly positive relationship between product 
evaluation and degree of economic development. Han and Terpstra (1988) show specifically that 
products with a country-of-origin label from a developing country were rated inferior to those 
with an industrial country-of-origin label and Head (1993) reports that a ‘Made in Germany’ 
label evokes the concepts of reliability, precision and punctuality. Liu et al. (2001) provide 
empirical evidence of a ‘level of development’ factor in the market for organic foods. 
Verlegh and  Steenkamp (1999) evaluated the findings of past country-of-origin studies 
within the marketing and business literature for the period 1980-1996   and found that the 
country-of-origin effect is strong especially for perceived quality and that one factor closely 
related to the evaluation of products in general is the level of development: the country-of-origin 
effects are significantly larger when products from more developed countries are compared with 
products from less developed countries. This finding supports the notion that consumers believe 
that products from LDCs are lower in quality, and associated with a larger risk of bad 
performance and dissatisfaction (Cordell, 1992) 
10.
Roth and Romeo (1992) argue  that consumers’ evaluations are based on the match 
between product and country: consumers prefer a country as an origin for specific products when 
they believe that there is a match between its perceived ``strengths'' and the skills that are needed 
for manufacturing the product under consideration: a strong positive match would exist when the 
country is perceived as being very strong in an area that was also an important feature for a 
product category. 
Actually in the case of credence goods   an important feature is the effectiveness of 
regulation, which in turn depends on good general and dedicated institutions. This is the specific 
skill required and consumers may establish a positive association with the level of development 
just as for the case of high quality technical products.  
In fact there is empirical evidence on the lower effectiveness of product regulation in 
developing countries. Stephenson (1997) provides a description of the situation at the beginning 
of the 1990s, showing for example that the number of national standards in developing 
countries, including large Latin American countries, for which data were available, was at least 
ten times lower than the corresponding number in the US and also the proportion of mandatory 
standards was comparatively low. Furthermore an indirect indication that standards are lower is 
provided by a vast literature on value chains coordination by multinationals, pointing out that 
10 Also, there is anecdotal evidence that in some poor countries some producers unlawfully package 
their products with a country of origin label different from their own, a “better” country of origin. 
6one of the main advantages for developing countries is the upgrading of standards (Cuffaro and 
Liu, 2008). 
4. CREDENCE GOODS, TRUST AND THE MARKET FOR HIGH QUALITY
The model analyses the impact of the effectiveness of regulation on the development of 
the market for high quality credence goods,  i.e. in a market where goods of actual different 
quality can be sold as high quality goods (examples are goods labeled environmentally friendly, 
or bio, or safe for children). 
The effectiveness of regulation is measured by the probability λ of being caught cheating 
on quality, internal consumer know that measure, and expected quality depends on it.  Figure 1 
shows the domestic market before trade. With perfect regulation only high quality producers 
participate in the market and the supply function is S0
D. The demand function is  0




If 1 l < , the supply function shifts to 1
D S  which represents the sum of product offered by 
cheaters and high quality producers. As consumers are aware that   1 l < , the demand curve 
rotates towards  1
D D ,  the equilibrium price decreases and consumers surplus is reduced. 
Figure 1 - Domestic market
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Extending the basic idea to trade, let’s assume that country/area A is a large exporter 
(country A has a comparative advantage based on factor endowment) and world price is formed 
on the internal market of A as a result of the interaction between internal demand D
D
 plus the 
demand for imports from the rest of the world D
I and supply in A, S
D (the same result could be 
obtained summing the excess function of this large country to the market of rest of the world). 





and the demand for imports from the rest of the world is D0
I ,  in country A total demand is D
T
0 
and the equilibrium is E
0.  A lower λ would reduce the expectations of internal and foreign 
consumers about quality in country A. Internal supply, internal demand,  the demand for imports 
and total demand for the high quality product rotate (dotted lines in figure 2a) and the new 
equilibrium is E
1. A negative stereotype would instead only rotate D
I
0 .
7In both cases if there were a minimum price of high quality, known to consumers,  below 
that price there would be no supply and no demand (as consumers know that the good cannot be 
high quality)   i.e. there may be no high quality production and export.
Analytically, in analogy with the model of Anania and Nisticò (2004), we assume that 
markets are competitive and there are high quality producers and  low quality producers who try 
to cheat.  
There are nH identical high quality producers and nL identical low quality producers, with 
marginal cost functions
H H H q c b =
L L L q c b =
With βH≠βL 
Each high quality producer produces a quantity such that  
H Hq P b =
Depending on the probability λ of being caught cheating, a fraction  ( ) 1 l - of low quality 
products is sold on the H market, therefore the expected marginal revenue of cheaters is P ( ) 1 l -
. Hence each low quality producer offers on the H market a quantity such that 
L Lq P b l = - ) 1 ( ,
The aggregate supply in the high quality market is:
8
Figure 2 Trade of credence goods 
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Assuming for simplicity that there is a continuum of mass 1 of producers of each type, 







2 ) 1 ( ) ( - + = (1bis)
The first term in the right hand side of equation (1bis) reflects the supply from high quality 
producers and the second term that from low quality producers that cheat. 
It is assumed that consumers agree on the order of preferences, they prefer a higher quality 
for a given price but have different intensity in their taste for quality, represented by a parameter 
θ, a real positive number. They have net utility U=θE(k)-P if they buy a good of expected quality 
E(k), where k is a random variable which can take two possible values, associated respectively 
to high or low quality, at price P. 
Although this framework implies a tradeoff between quality and price, it can be applied 
also to a context in which consumers are only interested in high quality –in the sense of a 
product with the specified standard, e.g. “bio”- but quality is probabilistic and there is  a tradeoff 
between the likelihood of getting the unwanted “attribute” and price.
Willingness to pay for a quality E(k) is given by θE(k), and increases with θ and E(k). 
Demand is equal to the number of consumers with parameter θ such that θE(k)≥P. Derivation of 
the demand function uses the ‘threshold’ consumer with a taste parameter q
~ who is indifferent 
to buying or not buying a unit of product of expected quality E(k) at price P,   [ ] 0 ) (
~






= q .  Under a number of assumptions (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Cuffaro, 
2008) demand is 
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where M is the total number of consumers.
Domestic consumers are aware of the measure of the effectiveness of regulation  l  and 

































This probability is zero if regulation is perfectly enforced  (λ=1) .  
k is a random variable which can take only two possible values, kH  and kL,    with 






















Expected quality E(k) is increasing in λ and it is equal 1  with λ=1.
Abiding by the general functional form of equation (2), and setting the mass of consumers 
M=1  domestic demand can be specified as follows:
H L
L P P D
b l b
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Assuming that there is no learning or very slow learning on the part of consumers because 
of the credence nature of the attributes considered, in these type of markets in equilibrium 
products of different qualities can be sold as high quality products, in the sense of products that 
respect the specified standard. 
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Solving equation (6) for P we obtain the following equilibrium price:
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The equilibrium price is increasing in E(k) and therefore in λ: better regulation on quality , 
here intended as the ability of regulators to exclude cheaters from the market, results in higher 
prices for high quality credence products.
The equilibrium quantity is 
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  and they are both 
strictly increasing in Ek and therefore in λ.
The model described by equations (1)-(6)  may also give insight on trade in two distinct 
cases. Considering a world with two regions, A and B, where A is “developing” and B is 
“developed, the first case is when there is no internal production in region B;  in the case of food 
this could be because of climate, and therefore it is not an irrelevant case. Supply in A is 
described by equation (1bis), demand is the sum of demand in A and B. The latter depends on 
how foreign consumers’ expectations are formed.
The second is a specific category of credence goods: some credence “ethical”  products 
such as “fair trade” products, which by definition are exported only by developing countries. In 
this case there would be no internal production in region B. Supply in A could be described by 
equation (1bis), demand in A is solely the demand for imports and it depends on how consumers 
in region B form expectations about regulation and quality in region A.  Generally speaking 
foreign consumers have less information than internal ones, but in this case they will likely 
assume that the incentive and/or ability of national regulators in any  developing exporter to 
“exclude” part of the supply from the market is low. Therefore, without alternative mechanisms 
of regulation, the situation is the same as in Figure 1 with λ “low”,  and the demand for imports 
would be “low” like in the case of D1
D. The development of these markets requires alternative 
forms of regulation: indeed for ethical products such as “fair trade” regulation is provided by 
supranational non profit organizations.
For trade in the general circumstances – there is internal supply in both countries - it is 
assumed that consumers are aware of the country of origin of the product and the traded product 
is a perfect substitute for the domestic one, except for consumers’ expectations about quality. 
Supply reflects factor endowment and regulation, country A (developing) has a comparative 
advantage based on factor endowment. 




P S = ) ( (8)
If consumers in B cannot distinguish between domestic production and imports, with trade 
expected quality becomes some average of the expectations about quality in B and A (as in 
Bureau, Marette and Schiavina, 1998). Low expectations  about quality of imports from A will 
shift downward internal demand for a credence good in B, reducing consumer surplus and the 
demand for imports. 
Lets consider instead the case where there is a country of origin label. 














































































   is increasing in E
B(k) (its first derivative in E
B(k) is strictly positive for 
positive values of c).
Consumers in the importing country are likely to form expectations on the quality of 
imports on the basis of several factors.  They may observe that there are imports which  fail 
border quality inspection:  the simplifying hypothesis adopted here is that the rate of failure is 
the same as the value of πL  in equation  (4). However, consumers in any importing country will 
probably be very uncertain about the conditions of supply for every exporting country and about 
the technology of border quality inspections (which can be limited and/or variable). Therefore 
consumers in B may, as implied by the literature discussed in paragraph 3, be influenced by a 
country of origin stereotype  linked to the level of development.
Foreign consumers expect high quality imports from A in line with probability 
12H
I
H d p p = (12)
1 0 £ ¶ £
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Here δ is increasing in the level of development – it is and index of reliability or positive 
country stereotype- hence (1-δ) is  the negative stereotype, which amplifies the perception of low 
quality  formed through the incidence of  import control failures.
Hence both the actual effectiveness of internal regulation in A and the country stereotype 
influence  expectations.
Equating import demand(10) and export supply (1bis minus 5)  the equilibrium price is
[ ][ ] d b b b d b l b b
d b b
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It is immediate to see that the equilibrium price  * P is strictly increasing in λ. Moreover, an 
easy computation proves that the first derivative of  * P  with respect to  is strictly positive, i.e. 
the equilibrium price  * P  is strictly increasing in , too.  
Besides, if a credence attribute is related to safety a change in λ  may cause a sudden and 
more than proportional drop in consumers’ confidence, depending on the nature of the problem, 
causing severe damage to the sector involved, as illustrated by several major food safety crises 
during the last decades. 
In such crises the adverse effects on health and on consumers’ confidence were often 
amplified by a combination of poor communication about risks, mismanagement of crisis 
responses on the part of governments and private companies and by the media (World Bank, 
2005). 
The developing exporter whose internal regulation on product quality has recently been 
most scrutinized is undoubtedly China. China however is not an exporter that can be easily 
“abandoned” by importers. Smaller countries could be much more damaged by a national 
stereotype problem
11. Indeed the World Bank (2005) remarks that international buyers and 
consumers are likely to be more tolerant and patient with core and long-standing suppliers that 
have established a national image in which they have confidence, and conversely, that  small 
11 An illustration of the possible impact on a small exporter is given by the cyclospora crisis and the 
change in the US import demand for raspberry from Guatemala to Mexico, a case in which the industry 
never recovered (World Bank, 2005); a similar sequence is quoted in Chisik (2003) for Colombia’s 
garment industry.
13countries and niche products are probably far more vulnerable to loss of markets and reputation 
in the face of safety or other quality problems.
CONCLUSIONS
There are several important implications of the trust and stereotype problem as represented 
here for an exporter, especially a developing country. 
  First, low effectiveness of regulation causes failures in the market for high quality 
credence goods.
 Second, there may be a trap of low levels of development/effectiveness of regulation  and 
failure in high quality exports. 
Therefore, strategies to increase the effectiveness of regulation, such as improving 
legislation and monitoring are crucial to improve export prospects. An important challenge is to 
increase the supply and quality of public standards and their associated monitoring mechanism. 
However,  if a developing country is not well prepared to achieve high levels of effectiveness of 
regulation   and/or if there is a strong country of origin prejudice, linked to the level of 
development, standard setting and enforcement by external actors, such as supermarkets, is 
beneficial. It is likely that this trust effect has been crucial for the growth of high quality food 
exports in many developing countries.  
Furthermore, one may reasonably argue that if there is a stereotype linked to the level of 
development it is unlikely that in the presence of a large income gap consumers would recognize 
the equivalence of different country standards. Instead, they are more likely to believe that 
different standards may be associated with low quality. The pursuit of “mutual recognition” of 
standards between two trading countries may be a good approach for an experience good, where 
consumers may verify quality when the good is allowed into the export market, but less so for a 
credence good. Mutual recognition requires considerable mutual trust, since it involves the 
presumption that national standards and regulations are merely different means of implementing 
equivalent regulatory goals and that national institutions do enforce the standards. Such trust is 
unlikely to emerge between countries with vastly different levels of development (Baldwin, 
2000; OECD, 2001). 
Therefore, in the long run, pursuing the international harmonization of standards, even if 
harmonization tends to be “hegemonic” (Baldwin, 2000),  is a better strategy for developing 
countries aiming at export markets.  For large producers such as  China government  to 
government   efforts   and/or   cooperation   between   importers   and   exporters   tend   to   press 
harmonization. Again it is smaller countries, where this attention may be lacking, that risk more. 
Finally, if the standard on a credence attribute is established and monitored by separate, 
non national entities such as NGOs, there obviously is no divergence between domestic and 
foreign consumers’ expectations about quality and the national prejudice problem may be 
bypassed.  Trust will be based on the NGO reputation and the perceptions consumers have about 
NGOs incentives and efficiency in monitoring compliance with standards. 
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